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Abstract 
 Using the revelations Edward Snowdon passed over to the press regarding the actions 
of the US’ National Security Agency and the UK’s GCHQ and their use of the Prism project, 
this article examines the law surrounding intelligence gathering in the US and UK. 
Underpinning the analysis is the legal principle of proportionality as applied to balancing the 
interests of national security and individual liberties. After examining intelligence exchange 
procedures, which for the UK is through negotiated agreements between national security 
agencies and through the European Union’s policing agency, Europol. The main part of the 
article discusses legal challenges that have been made regarding surveillance and the use of 
anti-terror laws on citizens and the rationale behind the judicial decisions made in both the 
US and UK jurisdictions. The argument forwarded is that there is a requirement for wide 
preventative powers being granted to counter-terrorism agencies and that as the interests of 
national security and individual liberty are inclusive and, as shown by the cases covered in 
this article, we should rely on the judiciary to perform their function in applying 
proportionality to each case on its own merits. 
Introduction 
 Former US National Security Agency (NSA) employee, Edward Snowden’s passing 
onto media sources classified documents relating to the practices of the NSA and the UK’s 
GCHQ, in particular the PRISM project resulted in condemnation of wide surveillance 
practices carried out by counter-terrorism agencies underpinned by concern of how respective 
states’ anti-terror legislation has widened those agencies powers to an extent it is effectively 
suffocating individuals’ liberty and widens the scope of criminalisation. This article examines 
the legislation governing surveillance related to terrorism in the US and the UK along with an 
analysis of the judicial scrutiny of state agencies practices in cases related to the legislation 
both pre and post the Snowden revelations. This leads to an explanation of why agencies like 
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the NSA and GCHQ require wide surveillance powers and the impact the revelation of stolen 
classified documents such as those passed on by Snowden to UK’s The Guardian newspaper 
can have on national security. The argument presented here is that in balancing the interests 
of national security and individual liberty the two are inclusive as the state has a 
responsibility to protect an individual’s personal liberty, but equally important the state must 
also protect its population from terrorist attacks. Therefore such powers are needed to keep 
people safe from indiscriminate terrorist attacks even if on occasions it infringes slightly on 
personal liberty 
 
Surveillance Powers Used in Terrorism Investigations 
 In gathering intelligence on terrorist related activity, statutory powers allowing covert 
surveillance is a vital investigatory tool. In doing so it is important state agencies work within 
the rule of law. It not only ensures their practices are legally proportionate, but by working 
within the rule of law it allows for transparency of those agencies’ operations revealing 
operational methods along with a transparency of accountability regarding decision making 
on granting authorities and misuse of powers by state officials.
1
  
US Powers 
There are two significant statutes authorising electronic surveillance in the US. 
Section 2516(1) Title 18 United States Code allows for covert surveillance to obtain 
intelligence on terrorist related activity when the Attorney-General authorises a Federal judge 
to grant a Federal agency an order to intercept of wire or oral or electronic communications. 
The second statute granting authority for electronic surveillance is the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA) where with Attorney-General approval a Federal agency 
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applies to a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
2
 for an authority to conduct electronic 
surveillance on ‘agents of foreign powers’ including persons suspected to be engaged in 
international terrorism.
3
 
 Following the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act (FISAA) 
brought about important changes on the FSA’s electronic surveillance powers including that 
the focus of the order is purely on the communications endpoint with no requirement of 
targets being specified. If the covert surveillance involves the likes of hidden microphones 
then there is a reasonable expectation of privacy by a citizen and the warrant must specify the 
target.
4
 One impact of the FISAA amendments is by authorising surveillance on non-US 
citizens outside US territory, those citizens’ personal data now comes under the range of US 
jurisdiction.
5
 While surveillance orders on US citizens located in the US has to have 
cognisance of the rights to privacy under the fourth amendment, no such right is applicable to 
foreign citizens. 
UK Powers 
Section 28(3) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) allows a court to 
grant when necessary in the interests of national security, or in preventing or detecting crime 
or disorder an authorisation to specified agencies including the police
6
 and UK intelligence 
services
7
 to conduct covert surveillance. Although RIPA provides an extensive range of 
circumstances how the surveillance can be conducted, the surveillance is limited to the UK. A 
RIPA authorisation must be compatible with the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).  
Intelligence Exchange between the US and the UK: the Role of Europol 
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Since 9/11 the international sharing of intelligence between counter-terrorism policing 
and national security agencies has increased. Between the USA and the UK this has 
invariably been carried out through the European Union’s (EU) policing agency, Europol. 
With a mandate to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange intelligence
8
 the 2009 Treaty 
of Lisbon (ToL) states Europol’s mission: 
‘…is to support and strengthen action by Member States police authorities and other law 
enforcement agencies through mutual co-operation in preventing serious crime affecting 
two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect interest by EU 
Policy.’9 
 
Following 9/11 the EU prioritised the fight against terrorism and within ten days of 
the attack the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Commission (JHA) adopted an action plan in 
the fight against terrorism resulting in acceleration in the development and implementation of 
measures to counter the threat international terrorism posed.
10
 Having the authority to sign 
international agreements, the agreement between Europol and the USA signed in 2001 is the 
most advanced. Intelligence is shared between the EU’s Member States’ policing agencies 
and specified US agencies
11
 that include the FBI, US Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the US postal Inspection.
12
  
The Treaty of Lisbon 
The EU tightened up its Member States’ co-operation with Europol through articles 
84-88 of the ToL. With the ToL being a primary source of EU law the legal principle of 
supremacy of EU law over Member States’ national law13 applies resulting in the Member 
States being legally obligated to the ToL’s articles. Article 84 ToL allows for the more potent 
EU legal instrument of directives being issued requiring Member States to co-operate with 
Europol.
14
 As EU directives come under the jurisdiction of the EU’s court, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), under the principle of the supremacy of EU law it allows the ECJ to 
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ensure compliance among the Member States.
15
 This is supported by Article 87 of the ToL 
that states Member States will adhere to police co-operation and this co-operation will 
include all national agencies involved in counter-terrorism and investigating organised crime 
with the agencies including customs agencies and other ‘specialised law enforcement 
agencies’. Perhaps the most significant development is article 88 that changed Europol’s role 
from simply supporting, facilitating and requesting action by national police agencies to now 
being in a clear and implicit partnership with the Member States’ agencies. To ensure 
genuine partnership exists between the Member States and the EU, article 88 ToL states 
another EU legal instrument, regulations, will be introduced to ensure compliance among the 
Member States.
16
 
These changes bolstering Europol’s role are important for two reasons that centre on 
accountability. Firstly, through the hierarchy of agencies associated with the JHA, Europol 
has a vertical legal legitimacy that is identifiable when compared the horizontal role of 
agencies made under the multi-lateral agreements.
17
 This is important regarding the second 
reason concerning accountability as by bringing Europol under the jurisdiction and scrutiny 
of the ECJ and the EU Parliament, under the ToL provisions, Europol’s actions come under 
the of rule of law where: 
‘The constitutive role of the rule of law relates to the means by which the community is 
governed: through law. The law regulates social relationships and therefore effective 
enforcement of the law is constitutive for the rule of law’18  
 
In its desire to ensure it can be an effective international actor, the EU’s counter-terrorism 
measures have led to an increased divergence of Member States’ law that can be achieved by 
replacing the framework decisions with the more effective regulations and directives.
19
 As 
well as enhancing the reputation and reliability of Europol’s role as an international actor 
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with Member States and third countries, the rationale behind the ToL changes is because the 
volume of EU criminal law and counter-terrorism measures are set to increase in the coming 
years
20
 requiring a stricter adherence to mutual co-operation between the Members States and 
Europol. In turn this will impact on the UK’s legal position in exchanging intelligence with 
third countries, including the US. An issue that may act as a brake to this improvement is 
what Argomaniz terms as the ‘Brusselsisation’ of terrorism that has produced a plethora of 
committees, expert groups agencies and bodies. He sees this as having led to inefficiencies in 
EU counterterrorism measures because of overlapping between structures within and outside 
the EU Framework,
21
 which has resulted in a degree of inter-institutional friction.
22
 That said, 
the ToL is the best opportunity the EU currently has to address these problems and 
weaknesses.
23
 
The Snowden Affair, National Security Interests and Protecting Individual 
Rights 
 
In June 2013 the UK newspaper The Guardian and the US newspaper The Washington 
Post broke with the news story regarding the NSA and the Prism programme that gave US 
Federal agencies direct access to servers in the biggest web firms including Google, 
Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and Apple.
24
 Snowdon released top secret documents to 
a Guardian journalist, Glenn Greenwald who, in the first of a number of reports, revealed the 
NSA was collecting telephone records of millions of US customers under a top secret order 
issued in April 2013 adding that, ‘…the communication records of millions of US citizens are 
being collected indiscriminately and in bulk regardless of whether they are suspected of any 
wrongdoing’.25 Adding the NSA’s mission had transformed from being exclusively devoted 
to foreign intelligence gathering Greenwald said it now focused on domestic communications.  
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As the revelations from the documents Snowdon passed on regarding the FSA’s 
activities increased, The Guardian reported that GCHQ also gained access to the network of 
cables carrying the world’s phone calls and Internet traffic and processed vast streams of 
sensitive personal information, sharing this with the NSA.
26
 This followed on from earlier 
reports that GCHQ accessed the FSA’s Prism programme to secretly gather intelligence, 
where between May 2012 –April 2013, 197 Prism intelligence reports were passed onto the 
UK’s security agencies, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch’s Counter-Terrorism Unit .27 GCHQ’s 
actions led to the German Justice Minister writing to British ministers regarding an allegation 
of mass surveillance by British intelligence asking for reassurance the actions were legal and 
if they were targeting German citizens.
28
 With reports from The Guardian that FSA actions 
were posing a threat to the privacy of EU citizens, this was a cause of concern for the EU’s 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) resulting in EU’s Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding 
stating: 
‘The European Commission is concerned about the possible consequences on EU 
citizens’ privacy. The Commission has raised this systematically in its dialogue with the 
US authorities, especially in the context of the negotiations of the EU-US data protection 
agreement in the field of police and judicial co-operation…’29  
 
During this dialogue the difference in legal culture between the EU and the US raised 
its head regarding individual’s rights in the respective jurisdictions with the EU’s focus being 
the dignity of citizens. In protecting fundamental human rights under the aegis of the rule of 
law the EU requires a system of protection of an individual citizen’s data privacy.30 There is 
no such explicit protection to a general right to privacy under the US Bill of Rights rather it is 
inferred in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
31
 This is important as Snowdon’s 
revelations had the potential to damage not only diplomatic relations between the US and EU 
Member States, but also affect the terrorism intelligence sharing between European counter-
9 
 
terrorism agencies via Europol and US federal agencies. To prevent US/UK diplomatic 
relations with the rest of the EU Member States deteriorating further, senior US and UK 
politicians were forced to speak openly and defend the actions of the FSA and GCHQ. The 
UK’s Foreign minister, William Hague said that both nations, ‘…operated under the rule of 
law’, with GCHQ being, ‘…scrupulous in complying with the law’ and used the intelligence 
to protect citizens’ freedoms.32 
 As a result of handing the secret documents to journalists the US Justice Department 
filing criminal charges against Snowden for espionage and theft of government documents 
and a provisional arrest warrant was issued by a federal court in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.
33
 To evade prosecution Snowden left the USA where he was granted temporary 
asylum by the Russian Government, causing further friction in the political relations between 
the US and Russia.
34
 Referring to ‘top secret’ documents Snowden passed on to them, The 
Guardian reported that from 2010-2013 the US government paid GCHQ  £100 million to 
secure access and influence over the UK’s intelligence gathering programmes.35 As these 
revelations were claiming to come from the secret documents Snowden passed on to 
Greenwald, it triggered the security services to act to retrieve the documentation at the 
earliest opportunity. 
The Importance of the Snowden Documents to UK Authorities 
 Hopkins and Ackermann reported the UK was useful to the US regarding gathering 
and storing intelligence as the legal framework in the UK is more flexible than the legal 
framework the FSA works under.
36
 To understand Hopkins and Ackerman’s point the two 
main pieces of UK legislation governing GCHQ surveillance are the Intelligence Services 
Act 1994 (ISA) and RIPA. The function of a secret intelligence service is to obtain and 
provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British islands 
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and to perform tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons
37
 adding this 
function is only exercisable when: 
1. It is in the interests of national security, in particular regarding the defence and 
UK foreign policy; or 
2. It is in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK; or 
3. It is in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.38 
 We can see the influence of the article 8 ECHR qualifications in the wording of section 1 
ISA as these qualifications to allow interference with citizens’ rights are virtually verbatim. 
In the UK section 1(2) of the Security Services Act 1989, provides a definition of national 
security stating: 
‘The function of the [security service] shall be the protection of national security and, in 
particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the 
activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or 
undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.’ 
It is the latter part of the definition that includes action not conforming to submissive 
behaviour that is sufficiently wide for the state to monitor UK citizens as well as foreign 
nationals, thereby allowing security agencies a wide leverage to interfere with citizens’ 
liberties.  
 When in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the UK or to 
support the prevention of crime or disorder, GCHQ’s function is to monitor or interfere with 
electronic or acoustic communications and provide assistance to UK government agencies 
and its armed forces.
39
 To carry out these functions GCHQ require a warrant issued by the 
Home Secretary.
40
 GCHQ also can utilise the powers of communication interception under 
RIPA
41
 which again, providing interception is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved 
where a warrant to intercept is issued under the provisions of any international mutual 
assistance agreement,
42
 which would apply to agreements between the NSA and GCHQ. 
From this agreement The Guardian reported that 36% of all the raw information GCHQ 
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obtained was passed onto the FSA giving the FSA access to all the sifted and refined 
intelligence GCHQ obtaine.
43
 When breaking down these sections of the relevant UK statutes, 
one can see why the media came to the conclusion that by having wide and flexible powers 
the UK has a place at the top table of intelligence agencies.
44
 
With Hopkins and Ackerman revealing they saw documentation on how and why 
GCHQ searched for material, including intelligence on the political intentions of foreign 
governments, political postures of foreign governments, terrorism, international trafficking 
and fraud, it caused a high degree of disquiet among UK government officials, the UK 
national security agencies (in particular GCHQ) and the UK’s Special Branch Counter-
Terrorism Units. One of the main concerns for the security agencies appeared to be what the 
documents Snowden passed on revealed regarding the methods of surveillance and technical 
capability the agencies’ surveillance equipment and the identity of Her Majesty’s 
Government personnel working in the area of national security, which, if it fell into the hands 
of those preparing or in the commission of acts of terrorism, such intelligence would be 
useful.
45
 It is estimated that at least 58,000 UK documents classified as top secret and secret 
information were stolen by Snowden from GCHQ
46
 that contained information on personnel 
and details of surveillance methods that could put the general public’s lives at risk.47 
Balancing the Interests of National Security with Individual Rights: 
Democracies, neo-Democracies and the Legal Principle of Proportionality  
  
Since 9/11 a significant, if not the majority of criminological and legal writing on the 
impact terrorism has had on democratic states and individual rights has focused on how 
recent terrorist acts have legitimised states’ illiberal legislative and policy responses to the 
terrorist threat they face resulting in a rights-based democracy being replaced by a ‘siege 
mode of democracy’.48 Referring to this transformation  as ‘dressing the window’ Gearty’s 
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concern is that the fear of terrorism is a facilitator to neo-democracies (including the UK and 
the US) where on its surface liberty, security and fundamental freedoms present themselves 
but in reality are only available to the few.
49
 If left uncontrolled, Gearty argues that by using 
the remit of terrorism, states can extend the core element of terrorism from being an 
indiscriminate assault on civilians to cover all sorts of conduct that when looked at closely is 
removed from what most people’s perception of terrorism is.50 This can result in the 
introduction of what he labels quasi-criminal law provisions that may have the appearance of 
freedom but in reality has no substance.
51
 Fenwick’s examination of post 9/11 UK anti-terror 
legislation found a significant rise in the adoption of authoritarian powers to policing 
agencies to curtail the liberty of persons who may be a terrorist threat in order to prevent 
terrorist activity before it occurs that places a strain on individuals’ rights.52 In the post 9/11 
era these powers include widening electronic surveillance on targets that includes subgroups 
as well as individuals, even communities who are perceived to be a threat and consequently 
the ‘enemy within’.53  
This is not a new response by states to threats to their national security. Bunyan 
chronicles how since its inception in 1880’s the UK’s Special Branch has conducted 
surveillance on individuals and communities ranging from a variety of political activists who 
have been seen as a threat that included telephone tapping and mail interception.
54
 Gill 
provides a similar chronology of state agencies conducting surveillance from the early 20
th
 
century in the UK and the US
55
 and Donohue’s work shows how not only in the UK where 
prior to 1985 both the national security services and the police conducted widespread 
surveillance using telephone taps and mail interception
56
 but also how the US has been 
imbued with a surveillance culture, especially since the 1920’s during the Hoover/FBI 
period.
57
 What today is termed electronic surveillance carried out by state agencies on 
individuals and groups considered as subversive or a threat to security through programmes 
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like PRISM should not come as a surprise as in democratic states this activity has taken place 
for many years. The issue to be concerned with is in relation to ownership of the electronic 
data, the authority the surveillance is conducted under and the legal provisions to protect 
citizens’ privacy.58  
Legal Challenges to US Surveillance Laws 
Court Decisions Pre-Snowden 
 
 Balancing the provisions of state surveillance and individuals’ liberty under the 
Fourth Amendment was established by the US Supreme Court in Katz v United States
59
 who 
held the test for privacy is only dependant where one would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Justice Harlan stated the expectation of privacy is one society is prepared to 
recognise as ‘reasonable’ but when one exposes their activities with others then privacy is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
60
 In Katz the Court emphasised the Fourth Amendment 
was introduced to protect people not places.
61
 
In balancing the rights of citizens to protecting national security Pious comments there 
should be the best combination of guarantees within the due process of law that protects 
citizens’ privacy that can run alongside: 
‘…strong government action that protects national security and our personal security as 
we travel on buses, trains, and airplanes.’62  
The rationale for adhering to due process of law is that it not only protects the accused, but it 
also helps guard against the prosecutorial zeal that sends false signals about who is a terrorist 
and what terrorists might be doing .
63
 An example of the US protecting individuals’ safety by 
focusing on liberty rather than the dignity of the individual is seen in the surveillance powers 
granted to US federal agencies where the Patriot Act 2001 amended the FISA provisions by 
changing the wording regarding the aim of intelligence gathering under the original FISA 
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from a ‘primary’ purpose to a ‘significant’ purpose.64 This allowed intelligence to be obtained 
from a wider range of potential sources,
65
 as these amendments bypass the US Constitution’s 
Fourth Amendment regarding citizens’ right to be secure in their persons, houses, paper and 
effects against unreasonable actions by government and police actions. 
 The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review considered the 
implications of this subtle change In Re Sealed Case N.02-0001.
66
 The Court held the shift 
from ‘primary’ to ‘significant’ purpose is a relaxation of the requirement of government to 
show its primary purpose was other than criminal prosecution saying: 
‘…In many cases, surveillance will have two key goals – the gathering of foreign 
intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. Determining which 
purpose is the ‘primary’ purpose of the investigation can be difficult, and will only 
become more so as we coordinate our intelligence and law enforcement efforts in the war 
against terror. Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is primary – 
law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill strikes a new balance. It will 
now require that a ‘significant’ purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence 
gathering to proceed with surveillance under FISA. The effect of this provision will be to 
make it easier for law enforcement to obtain FISA search or surveillance warrant for 
these cases where the subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of valuable 
intelligence and the potential target of a criminal prosecution.’   
 As a result of the Court’s decision, the FBI can now help local law enforcement 
agencies bypass the Fourth Amendment requirements in gathering evidence in matters related 
to foreign intelligence even where it might not be for wholly related ordinary crimes.
67
 
 Another example of how national security and safeguarding a person’s safety can 
override individual’s liberty provisions in US anti-terrorism law is seen in Clapper (Director 
of Notional Intelligence et al) v Amnesty International.
68
 The US Supreme Court was asked 
to examine the FISAA amendments to section 702 FISA and the warrantless wire-tapping 
power. The respondents (who were lawyers, and, human rights and media organisations) 
claimed that the state in by-passing their Fourth Amendment rights this section was 
unconstitutional. The foundation of their claim was they were regularly engaging in sensitive 
international communications with individuals likely to be targets of surveillance and being 
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US citizens they stated their Fourth Amendment rights were breached by the surveillance 
orders. By a 5-4 majority, the US Supreme Court dismissed the respondents’ claim as purely 
speculative. In delivering the judgement, Justice Alito said: 
‘…respondents have no actual knowledge of the Government’s targeting practices. 
Instead, respondent’s merely speculate and make assumptions about whether their 
communications with their foreign contacts will be acquired under s.702’69 [my emphasis] 
This decision was subject to much criticism from US human rights and lawyer groups. The 
American Bar Association argued that the US President does have a constitutional obligation 
to authorise all surveillance.
70
 Opinions are summed up by legal advocates claiming the 
Clapper decision handed the US government a ‘get out of jail free’ card for national security 
statutes).
71
 With no judicial supervision on the wire-tapping powers and, even if it was a 
speculative assumption, the fact there was the opportunity for the state to interfere, if this had 
gone before a European Court there is the likelihood that Court would have found for the 
respondents. This is supported by the four dissenting judges where Justice Breyer said the US 
Constitution does not require concrete proof only something where there is a ‘reasonable 
probability’ or a  ‘high probability’.72  
Court Decisions Post Snowden 
 In December 2013 two significant cases were heard where following the Snowden 
revelations the applicants claimed their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the 
NSA and the Federal Government. In Klayman et al v Obama et al
73
 the US District Court for 
the District of Columbia heard a judicial review challenging the authorisation of intelligence 
gathering relating to the wholesale collection of phone record metadata of all US citizens. An 
authority was granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in April 2013 
concerning the applicants where in his judgment Justice Leon held the applicants have 
sufficient legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Government’s bulk 
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collection of phone record metadata under their Fourth Amendment claim.  In his 
deliberations Justice Leon said that while Congress has great latitude to create statutory 
schemes like FISA, ‘…it may not hang a cloak of secrecy over the [US] Constitution’.74 
Distinguishing the applicants’ claim in Klayman from the US Supreme Court’s finding in 
Clapper Justice Leon said in Clapper the applicants could only speculate as to whether they 
were ‘surveilled’ whereas in Klayman there was strong evidence their telephony metadata 
had been collected.
75
 Underlying Justice Leon’s judgement was his scepticism relating to the 
impact such wide surveillance practices has on identifying terrorists and thereby preventing 
terrorist attacks. He said: 
‘I am not convinced at this point in the litigation that the NSA’s database has ever truly 
served the purpose of rapidly identifying terrorists in time-sensitive investigations, and 
so I am certainly not convinced that the removal of two individuals from the database 
will “degrade” the program in any meaningful sense’ [original emphasis] 
 
 Again concerning the NSA’s collection of phone record metadata, eleven days after 
the Klayman decision Justice Pauley III from the US District Court of Southern district of 
New York took an opposite view in his judgement in American Civil Liberties Union et al v 
James R. Clapper et al.
76
 After commencing his judgement with pre-9/11 example of the 
hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar who had seven telephone calls intercepted by the NSA but who 
could not capture the telephone number identifier and if they could they would have been 
able to pass onto the FBI that he was  calling a Yemeni safe house from inside the US,
77
 
Justice Pauley III cites a number of NSA investigations where he justifies the effectiveness of 
NSA’s surveillance through bulk telephony metadata.78 Acknowledging that if left unchecked 
this investigative tool can imperil citizens’ liberty along with the fact that Snowden’s 
‘unauthorised disclosure’ of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders has provoked a 
public debate he held these orders were lawful.
79
 In his summation Justice Pauley III found 
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there to be no evidence that the US Government had used any of the bulk telephony data for 
any other purpose than investigating and ‘disrupting’ terrorist attacks80 saying: 
‘The choice between liberty and security is a false one, as nothing is more apt to imperil 
civil liberties than the success of a terrorist attack…’81 
This is important as the interests of national security and protecting individual liberties are 
not exclusive, they are inclusive. This is where the legal principle of proportionality plays an 
important part in judicial decision making. Utilitarian in nature, proportionality balances the 
interests of wider society with the interests of the individual. 
UK Courts and the ECHR 
UK Judiciary’s Clashes with the European Court of Human Rights   
 
Regarding the minimum rights citizens are entitled to expect, the UK has to take 
cognisance of the provisions contained in the ECHR. ECHR rights are broken in to three 
main categories, absolute rights which the state cannot interfere with, limited rights where the 
state has limited power to interfere and qualified rights where the state can interfere with 
these rights provided certain provisions as listed in the respective qualified rights are met and 
the interference is necessary in a democratic society. The ECHR article appertaining to 
surveillance and intelligence sharing is the qualified article 8 (right to privacy and family life). 
In Klass v Germany the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) examined article 8 and 
while acknowledging that surveillance is a necessary evil in a democracy, held that when the 
state carries out covert surveillance its actions must be proportionate.
82
  
 One potential problem with intelligence sharing between the EU Member States and 
the USA is the different focus on human rights legal culture. While the US focuses on liberty, 
the EU’s focus is on the dignity of the citizen.83 Regarding cases brought to court related to 
terrorism statutory provisions and statutory provisions relating to evidence useful in counter-
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terrorism investigations the UK’s judicial decisions have been at odds to those made in the 
ECtHR. An example of this was in relation to the retention of DNA and fingerprint samples 
retained on a national database in England and Wales that went to the ECtHR in S and 
Marper v UK.
84
 S and Marper provided samples during a police investigation and even 
though they were not convicted of a criminal offence, the samples were retained on national 
database. As result they both claimed their article 8 ECHR right to privacy had been violated. 
Both the High Court
85
 and the House of Lords
86
 appellate courts held that there was no such 
violation. In dismissing S and Marper’s appeal Lord Steyn stated that while accepting the 
Court must interpret the ECHR in a way that is in line with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence he 
held that: 
‘The whole community, as well as the individuals whose sample was collected, benefits 
from there being as large a database as it is possible …The benefit to the aims of accurate 
and efficient law enforcement is thereby enhanced.’87 
 
While Lord Steyn was adopting the approach that interests of the wider community overrides 
the interests of the individual, when the case went before the ECtHR they saw the dignity of 
the individual as overriding the interests of the wider community saying: 
‘…have due regard to the specific context in which information at issue is recorded and 
retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used and processed 
and the results that may be obtained.’88 
 
In this judgement the ECtHR emphasised that for powers to be compatible with the rule of 
law there must be adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and accordingly indicate 
with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion on the competent authorities and the manner of 
its exercise.
89
 This decision was instrumental in forcing the UK Government to introduce 
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legislation that took account the ECtHR’s decision that where a person is not convicted of a 
criminal offence their DNA and fingerprint samples are destroyed.
90
 
 Another example where the UK appellate court decision making was in conflict with 
the ECtHR is seen in Gillan and Quinton v UK
91
 that resulted in section 44 of the UK’s 
Terrorism Act 2000 being repealed. A stop and search power, section 44 allowed police 
officers to stop and search persons and vehicles
92
 for articles that could be used in connection 
with terrorism.
93
 Authorised by a senior police officer of at least assistant chief constable 
rank,
94
 when carrying out this search, a police officer did not require any grounds for 
suspecting the presence of articles that could be used in terrorism.
95
 Especially following the 
London bombing in 2005, an unpopular side-effect in the use of this power was the majority 
of citizens stopped by the police were disproportionately of black or Asian ethnicity.
96
 The 
ECtHR held that section 44 violated article 5 (right to liberty) ECHR as account must be 
taken of a whole range of criteria such as type of search, duration, effects on the person and 
the implementation of the measure
97
 and article 8 ECHR where the ECtHR held:  
‘…the public nature of the search may, in certain cases, compound the seriousness of the 
interference because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment. Items such as bags, 
wallets, notebooks and diaries may, moreover, contain personal information which the 
owner may feel uncomfortable about having exposed to the view of his companions or 
the wider public’98 
Applying the legal principle of proportionality we see the ECtHR seeing the dignity of the 
individual prevailing over the interests of the wider community that is related to the needs of 
national security.  
UK Appellate Courts Decisions that changed anti-terror laws  
 It is not just individual sections of UK anti-terror laws that have been required to 
change following human rights case decisions, large parts of statutes, even whole statutes 
themselves have been repealed because the protection of individual liberties took precedence 
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over national security. These changes were brought about as result of decisions made by UK 
appellate courts where they took cognisance of the ECHR. An example of this is the UK’s 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Act 2011 (TPIMS). The evolution of the Act can be 
traced back the decision in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
99
 
where in 2001 the House of Lords’ decision resulted in Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 being repealed. Under Part IV the Home Secretary could authorise the 
imprisonment of foreign nationals who were suspected terrorists without any judicial process. 
The House’s concern was the lack of judicial supervision in imprisoning individuals and 
consequently found that Part IV of the Act violated articles 5 and article 6 (right to fair trial) 
ECHR.
100
 Introducing control orders for both foreign and national citizens who had to wear 
an electronic tagging device and abide by very strict bail conditions that severely impinged 
on the movement of those subject to an order, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 replaced 
the repealed Part IV. Control orders were also challenged in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AP.
101
 In the UK Supreme Court’s decision in AP the dignity of the person was 
evident as the interests of individual liberty prevailed over national security as the Court held 
the 2005 Act violated articles 5 and 8 ECHR because the control order forced AP to live in a 
town 150 miles away from his family. A relevant point Gearty makes regarding the harshness 
in the conditions imposed on persons subject to control orders is none of persons were 
charged with criminal offences and that control orders, ‘…stood outside the normal law’.102 
As a result the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was repealed and replaced with TPIMS that 
introduced surveillance orders issued on specific persons with less stringent controls on their 
personal life. 
Issues Surrounding Control Orders and Blacklists  
 In their various conditions these UK counter-terrorist orders have been subject to 
much controversy as they restrict the liberty of individuals suspected to be involved in 
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terrorist activity where there is insufficient evidence to charge and convict them of terrorist 
offences. Fenwick sees such orders as counterproductive as they were targeted mainly against 
members of the UK’s Muslim community therefore making that community a ‘suspect 
community’ resulting in making it more likely that some Muslims may be drawn into terrorist 
activity.
103
 In relation to the A and others decision Gearty is critical of the House of Lords 
decision to only declare Part IV of the 2001 Act as incompatible with the ECHR and not let 
the applicants ‘go free’.104 Gearty fails to mention that UK courts cannot do this in relation to 
statutory provisions as unlike many other states’ constitutions under the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy the UK judiciary do not have the power to declare a statute as 
unconstitutional as constitutionally the UK judiciary are subordinate to Parliament. In relation 
to statues, the judiciary’s role is to interpret statutes giving effect to the will of Parliament.105 
Allowing UK appellate courts under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to declare 
statutory provisions as incompatible with the ECHR has been a significant move towards the 
judiciary in overturning Parliamentary statues. The UK courts have utilised this measure that 
has to some extent kept the UK’s executive in check regarding anti-terrorist related statutory 
measures that are disproportionate, none more so than control orders. For example UK courts 
have held that 18-hour curfews in control orders were seen as excessive and disproportionate 
therefore violating article 5 ECHR
106
 and where following a review of evidence there was no 
possibility of a criminal prosecution in relation to terrorist offences a control order was 
flawed.
107
 As a result of these and other cases such as AP the UK courts did in effect force the 
UK Parliament to change the law.  
Focusing on terrorist related ‘blacklists’ Gearty cites the examples of Nada108 and 
Kadi
109
 whose respective liberty and freedom of movement was at risk leading him to say 
that ‘our security’ must trump their freedom as blacklists (and one could add control orders) 
only apply to people like them (where one presumes Gearty is referring to Muslims) and 
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therefore it does not affect ‘one jot’ how we experience freedom110 is disparaging. Two issues 
should be considered here. First is in their decision making the judiciary have shown their 
independence from their states’ executives. As discussed above both the UK and the US 
jurisdictions have in effect put the brakes on excesses into an individual’s liberty incurred 
through terrorism related legislation. A further example of this was seen in the New York 
State Court of Appeal’s judgement in The People v Edgar Morales111 where the Court held: 
‘The concept of terrorism has a unique meaning and its implications risk being trivialised 
if the terminology is applied loosely in situations that do not match our collective 
understanding of what constitutes a terrorist act’112 
Secondly for every Nada there is a Lee Rigby who dies at the hands of terrorists
113
 and for 
every Kadi there is an Erika Brannock who is permanently disabled after losing a limb in an 
indiscriminate terrorist attack.
114
 Detention can be temporary but death or disability is 
permanent. Naming individuals to personalise victims of excessive state terror provisions can 
also be applied to victims of terrorist attacks as this shows how imperative it is to ensure 
proportionality is applied by the courts in balancing the interests of wider society in the name 
of national security with the interests of the individual and their liberty. It is the court’s duty 
to protect both. 
PRISM, Miranda, Journalistic Material and Schedule 7 Powers  
 
 Following the Snowden revelations the UK courts were called on to perform this duty. 
On the 18
th
 August 2013 while carrying materials Snowden passed onto The Guardian 
journalist Glenn Greenwald, Greenwald’s partner David Miranda was stopped under 
Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 by Special Branch Counter-Terrorism officers at London’s 
Heathrow Airport when he was catching a connecting flight to Brazil. Miranda was detained 
for nine hours where his electronic possessions were seized and examined and he was 
interviewed.
115
 Miranda’s laptop, mobile phone, memory sticks and DVD’s were seized116 
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and this raised questions over what legally amounts to journalistic material, which 
traditionally cannot be searched by the police in a democratic state. In England, the Police 
and Criminal Act 1984 provides a wide definition of what amounts to journalistic material by 
simply stating it is material acquired and created for the purposes of journalism.
117
 The 
Guardian’s editor, Rusbridger maintained that Miranda was in possession of journalistic 
material saying: 
‘The state is building such a formidable apparatus of surveillance it will do its best to 
prevent journalists from reporting on it. … I wonder how many have truly understood the 
absolute threat to journalism implicit in the idea of total surveillance, when or if it comes 
– and, increasingly, it looks like when’.118  
Regarding the incident one issue omitted by Rusbridger is that Miranda was not carrying the 
usual journalistic material, it had the potential to be stolen state secrets, which if they had 
been lost or acquired or shown to the wrong hands could have been damaging to state 
security.  
Schedule 7 Powers 
 Schedule 7 exists to allow officers in relation to terrorist activity to collect 
intelligence on the movements of persons of interest to the police and the Security Service.
119
 
Schedule 7 powers can only be used by police officers
120
 at ports and airports in order to stop 
and question persons that are or may be concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism.
121
 No reasonable grounds to suspect a person is involved in 
terrorism are needed by the officer to stop and interview those detained.
122
 Under Schedule 7 
persons detained have the right to consult with a lawyer in private at public expense
123
 and it 
is expected the consultation with a lawyer at a port will normally be by a private telephone 
conversation.
124
 They have no right to have a lawyer present if the request is made to frustrate 
the proper purpose of the schedule 7 examination
125
 and they have no right to silence as they 
must answer all questions put to them.
126
 The officers are permitted to search that person and 
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anything they have with them
127
 and can detain that person’s property for up to seven days to 
examine the property that person has with them.
128
 The media’s concern was over what 
appeared to be the use of arbitrary police powers, with the most vitriolic being Greenwald 
who wrote: 
‘This is obviously a rather profound escalation of their attacks on the news-gathering 
process and journalism. It’s bad enough to prosecute and imprison sources. It’s worse 
still to imprison journalists who report the truth. But to start detaining the family 
members and loved ones of journalists is simply despotic.’129  
 
Even though the UK Home Secretary justified the use of Schedule 7 powers on Miranda 
stressing that his detention of nine hours was exceptional, in their protestations The Guardian 
and other media outlets still omitted to point out that what Snowden passed on were stolen 
secret state documents, property of the US and UK governments respectively. 
UK Courts’ decision on Schedule 7 powers  
 The question the courts have to address is if Schedule 7 powers are proportionate. 
With coincidental timing, in August 2013 Sylvie Beghal v Director of Public Prosecutions
130
 
went before the UK’s High Court where Beghal was challenging Schedule 7 powers 
regarding their potential violation of ECHR rights. A French national and the wife of a 
convicted terrorist, Beghal arrived at England’s East Midlands Airport and was detained 
under Schedule 7. The police did not suspect her of being a terrorist, but they wanted to speak 
to her to establish if she may be a person concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of terrorism.
131
 The police permitted her to speak to a lawyer but she was told they 
would not delay the questioning pending the arrival of her lawyer. 
 The Court found no violation of articles 5, 6 and 8 ECHR through the use of Schedule 
7 saying these powers are not arbitrary,
132
 in the court’s opinion they are proportionate and 
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permissible. The Court said that while rights protecting a defendant from prejudice are 
important, when applying the legal principle of proportionality what outweighs individual 
rights is the protection of the public in combatting terrorism.
133
 On this point Lord Justice 
Gross said: 
‘Inhibiting or deterring the travel of someone otherwise engaged in the commission of 
acts for terrorism serves, in our view, manifestly rational purpose related to port and 
border control. …realistically the ability to question widely is necessary to build up a 
picture of the travel in question and its connection (if such there be) to acts of terrorism.’  
 
In 2014 Miranda’s claim against his Schedule 7 stop and interview came before 
the UK’s High Court.134 Miranda’s main contention is that he was unlawfully stopped 
as it was clear he was not a terrorist, the use of this power on him was disproportionate 
and that he was carrying protected journalistic material therefore rendering the search 
and seizure by the police of the materials he was carrying unlawful. Laws LJ made it 
clear that the purpose of Schedule 7 is not to determine if a traveller is a terrorist only 
assess if they directly or indirectly were involved in a wide range of activities that may 
be concerned with terrorism.
135
 Regarding the proportionality Laws LJ held that the 
stopping of Miranda was proportionate as the material Miranda was suspected to have 
at the time was not media reporting on terrorism, it was to ascertain the nature of the 
material he was carrying and therefore fell properly with the construction of Schedule 
7.
136
  
 Regarding whether the material in Miranda’s possession was journalistic 
material, one fact influencing the Court’s decision this was not that case was the belief 
that Miranda was potentially in possession of a substantial number of the 58,000 
documents stolen by Snowden.
137
 The information Miranda possessed if released, even 
via the media where the intrinsic significance of the material was not understood was 
deemed by the Court to be a ‘gift to the terrorist’.138 Even though Greenwald claimed 
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that journalists share with the government the responsibility of what is required by way 
of withholding publication for the protection of national security, this was dismissed as 
the Court made it clear that journalists have no constitutional responsibility.
139
 This is 
an important point as the media cannot be held to account in law in this area the same 
way public bodies can. These key points were influential in the Court finding that 
Miranda’s Schedule 7 stop and detention was not only legitimate it was also ‘very 
pressing’ and in striking a balance between public interest/press freedom  and national 
security, the Court found in favour of national security. 
Conclusion: The Balance between the Interests of National Security and 
Individuals’ Liberty 
 
The rationale behind pre-emptive counter-terrorism powers is they are exercised on 
identifying individuals who might commit crimes related to terrorism with the aim of the 
investigators to remove the individual’s ability to carry out terrorist related activity.140 The 
more broadly drafted legislation is, it invariably widens the powers of counter-terrorism 
agency officers to intrude deeper into the everyday lives of citizens. As a result it gives those 
officers greater ability to bring an ever widening group of citizens into their gaze and 
consequently into their intelligence systems. As this discussion has emphasised, the interests 
of national security and individual liberty are not exclusive, they are inclusive. They are not 
opposing poles but a seamless web of protection incumbent upon the state.
141
 While 
individual liberty is precious and must be protected from unnecessary state incursion by the 
judiciary, keeping citizens safe from terrorist attacks is equally important. As Yoo’s study 
found this is what the majority of citizens want even if it is bordering on infringing individual 
liberty.
142
 In a poll held following revelations of NSA practices, in June 2013 nearly half of 
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US citizens polled approved of everyone’s emails being monitored if in doing so it might 
avert a terrorist attack.
143
 
 The former MI5 Director revealed in the UK between 2001-2012 43 serious 
terrorist plots or potential attacks were prevented, adding that the terrorist threat is real and 
remains with us today.
144
 As seen with the example of control orders, the danger is what 
Gearty refers to as quasi-criminal law provisions such as control orders being introduced as 
preventative measure. As seen above, when applying the legal principle of proportionality, 
judicial scrutiny ensured that legal measures are kept in check. It is not the media’s role to do 
this. The role of a free media in a democracy is through their freedom of expression to act as 
a watchdog by acting as a check on political and other holders of power, hence its nickname 
of the Fourth Estate.
145
 It is accepted that with Snowden passing on the NSA/GCHQ 
documents to The Guardian, the newspaper was attempting to do this. However it is not the 
media’s role to handle stolen classified document and decide what to reveal from that 
documentation that they perceive is in the public interest and safe to publish without 
jeopardising national security. The danger is journalists inadvertently releasing information 
that would be useful to a terrorist. Following the Snowden revelations the current MI5 
Director, Andrew Parker said that making public the reach and limits of national security 
agencies’ techniques is damaging adding: 
‘Such information hands the advantage to the terrorists. It is the gift they need to evade 
us and strike at will. Unfashionable as it might seem, that is why we must keep secrets 
secret, and why not doing so causes such harm.’146 (Parker 2013, paragraph 59) 
  
 In adopting preventative measures both governments and their counter-terrorism 
agencies must assess the risk such measures present to individual’s liberties balanced with a 
proportionate application of those measures to prevent terrorist activity.
147
 As discussed 
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above, this is what the UK and US judiciary are assessing in their judgments. Palmer notes in 
his work that most writing in this area has been hijacked by a legal and academic elite rather 
than an enlightened political, legal and social order where he adds, ‘Ideology cannot address 
immanent [terrorist] threats’.148 Adopting such a position does not denigrate the view that 
security and liberty interests are inclusive and the importance of ensuring individuals’ liberty 
is not railroaded by terrorism related legislation, but as Palmer opines, little has been written 
about the reality of countering terrorism, which includes the practical issues in confronting 
agencies tasked to protect the public from terrorist attacks.
149
 It is hoped that by examining 
the judicial responses to terrorism related legislation this work goes some way to doing that.  
References 
                                                          
1
 International Commission of Jurists (2009) Assessing Damage, Urging Action Geneva: ICR  p.68 
2
 50 USC section 1804 
3
 50 USC section1807(b)(1)(C) 
4
 Liu, E.C. (2013) Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act CRS Report for Congress 7-5700, p.7 
5
 Bigo, D. et al (2013) Open Season for Data Fishing on the Web CEPEA Policy Brief no.293 18
th
 June 2013, p.3 
6
 RIPA Schedule 1(1) 
7
 RIPA Schedule 1(5) 
8
 Berenskoetter, F. (2012) Mapping the Field of UK/EU Policing Journal of Common Market Studies 50(1) 37-53, 
p.41 
9
 Article 88 ToL 
10
 Joffe, G. (2008) The European Union, Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in the Maghreb Journal of Common 
Market Studies 46(1) 147-171, p158, Kaunert, C. (2010) Europol and EU Counterterrorism: International 
Security Actorness in the External Dimension Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33(7) 652-671, p.653 
11
 Kaunert (see note 10) p.664 
12
 Den Boar, M., Hillebrand, C. abd Nolke, A. (2008) Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of 
Counterterrorism Networks Journal of Common Market Studies 46(1) 101-124, p.102 
13
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 
14
 Once passed through the EU Parliament, directives must be implemented and brought into national law by 
member States within the period specified in the directive. 
15
 Article 87 ToL 
16
 Once passed through the EU Parliament, EU Regulations will be implemented and brought into national law 
by Member States straight away. 
17
 Den Boar, Hillebrand and Nolke (see note 12) p.106 
18
 Murphy, C.C. (2012) EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law Oxford: Oxford University 
Press p.35 
19
 Ibid p.225 
20
 Ibid p.241 
21
 Argomaniz, J. (2012) The EU and Counter-Terrorism London: Routledge p.69 
22
 Ibid p.70 
23
 Ibid p.76 
24
 BBC News 7
th
 June 2013 ‘Web Privacy – outsourced to the US and China? Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22811002 [accessed 1st September 2013] 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
25
 Greenwald, G. (2013) NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily The Guardian 6
th
 
June 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order [accessed 1st September 2013]  
26
 MacAskell, E., Borger, J., Davies,N. and Ball, J. (2013) GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to 
world’s communications The Guardian 21
st
 June 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa [accessed 1st 
September 2013] 
27
 Hopkins, N. (2013) UK gathering secret intelligence via covert NSA operation The Guardian 7
th
 June 2013 
retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/07/uk-gathering-secret-intelligence-nsa-
prism [accessed 1st September 2013]  
28
 BBC News 25rth June 2013 ‘Germany seeks UK surveillance assurance’ retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23048259 [accessed 1st September 2013] 
29
 Watt, N. (2013) PRISM scandal: European commission to seek privacy guarantees from US The Guardian 10
th
 
June 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/prism-european-commissions-
privacy-guarantees [accessed 1st September 2013] 
30
 Murphy (see note 18) p.149 
31
 Whitman, J.Q. (2004) The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty 113 Yale Law Journal 
1151-1179, p.1155 
32
 BBC News 26
th
 June ‘US-UK intelligence-sharing indispensable says Hague’ retrieved form 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23053691 [accessed 2nd September 2013] 
33
 BBC News 22
nd
 June 2013 ‘NSA leaks: US charges Edward Snowden with spying’ retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23012317 [accessed 1st September 2013] 
34
 BBC News 1
st
 August 2013 ‘NSA spy leaks: Snowden thanks Russia for asylum’ retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23541425 [accessed 2nd September 2013] 
35
 Hopkins, N. and Borger, J. (2013) Exclusive: NSA pays £100m in secret funding for GCHQ The Guardian 1
st
 
August 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-
edward-snowden [accessed 2nd September 2013] 
36
 Hopkins, N. and Ackermann, S. (2013) Flexible laws and weak oversight give GCHQ room for manoeuvre The 
Guardian 2
nd
 August 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/02/gchq-laws-
oversight-nsa [accessed2nd September 2013] 
37
 Section 1(1) ISA 
38
 Section 1(2) ISA 
39
 Section 3 ISA 
40
 Section 5 ISA 
41
Section 4 RIPA  
42
 Section 5(3) RIPA 
43
 Hopkins, N., Borger, J. and Harding, L. (2013) GCHQ: inside the top secret world of Britain’s biggest spy 
agency The Guardian 2
nd
 August 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/aug/01/gchq-spy-agency-nsa-edward-snowden 
[accessed 2nd September 21013] 
44
 Hopkins and Ackermann (see note 36) 
45
 Sparrow, A., Gabbart, A. and Quinn, B. (2013) Reactions to the detention of David Miranda at Heathrow 
Airport – as it happened The Guardian 20
th
 August 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2013/aug/19/glenn-greenwald-partner-detained-live-reaction 
[accessed 3rd September 2013] 
46
 From Laws LJ’s judgement in Miranda v The Secretary of State for the Home Department and the 
Commissioner of the Police and Metropolis [2014] EWHC 255 at paragraph 64 
47
 Ibid at paragraph 53 
48
 Palmer, P. (2012) Dealing with the exceptional: pre-crime anti-terrorism policy and practice Policing & 
Society 22(4) 519-537, pp.521-522 
49
 Gearty, C. (2012) Liberty & Security Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.55-56 
50
 Ibid p.33 
51
 Ibid p.46 
52
 Fenwick, H. (2008) Proactive counter-terrorism strategies in conflict with human rights International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology 22(3) 259-270 pp.259-260 
53
 Palmer (see note 48) p.522 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
54
 Bunyan, T. (1976) The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain London: Quartet Books pp.131-150 
55
 Gill, P. (1994) Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State London: Frank Cass 
pp.151-170 
56
 Donohue, L.K. (2008) The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press pp.188-190 
57
 Ibid pp.218-299 
58
 Bigo et al (see note 5) p.5 
59
 389 US 347 (1967) 
60
 Ibid at paragraph 361 
61
 Donohue (see note 56) p.221 
62
 Pious, R.M. (2006) The War in Terrorism and the Rule of Law Los Angeles Ca: Roxbury Publishing Company 
p.13 
63
 Ibid p.16 
64
 Ibid p.34 
65
 Gearty (see note 48) p.78 
66
 310 F.3d 717 (2002) 
67
 Pious (see note 62) p.48, Donohue (see note 56) p.234, Gearty (see note 49) p.78 
68
 (2013) 568 US No. 11-1025 
69
 Ibid at paragraph IIIA 
70
 International Commission of Jurists (see note 1) p.70 
71
 Sledge, M. (2013) Supreme Court’s Clapper v Amnesty International Decision Could Affect Indefinite 
Detention Huffington Post 27
th
 February 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/27/clapper-v-amnesty-international_n_2769294.html [accessed 5th 
September 2013] 
72
 Clapper at 20 paragraph 4 
73
 (2013) Civil Action Number 13-0881 (RJL) 
74
 Ibid at 34 
75
 Ibid  at 36 
76
 (2013) 13 Civ 3994 (WHP) 
77
 Ibid at 1-2 
78
 Ibid at 48-49 
79
 Ibid at 2 
80
 Ibid at 52 
81
 Ibid at 52 
82
 (1978) (Application number 5029/71) at paragraph 68 
83
 Donohue (see note 56) p.208, Murphy (see note 18) p.149 
84
 (2008) (Application numbers 30562/04 and 30566/04) 
85
 R(S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and the Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
R(MARPER) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] 1 WLR 3223 
86
 R(S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and the Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
R(MARPER) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] UKHL 39 
87
 Ibid at paragraph 78 
88
 (2008) (Application numbers 30562/04 and 30566/04)a t paragraph 67 
89
 Ibid at paragraph 95 
90
 Section 1 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
91
 (2010) (Application no. 4158/05) 
92
 Section 44 (1) Terrorism Act 2000 
93
 Section 45(1) (a) Terrorism Act 2000 
94
 Section 44(4) Terrorism Act 
95
 Section 45(1)(b) Terrorism Act 2000 
96
 Parmer, A. (2011) Stop and search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive? Policing & Society 
21(4) 369-382 p.370 
97
 Gillan and Quinton v UK (2010) (Application no. 4158/05) at paragraph 56 
98
 Ibid at paragraph 63 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
99
 [2004] UKHL 56 
100
 Gearty (see note 49) p.90 
101
 [2010] UKSC 24 
102
 Gearty (see note 49) p.92 
103
 Fenwick (see note 52) p.268 
104
 Gearty (see note 49) p.90 
105
 Barnett, H. (2013) Constitutional & Administrative Law London: Routledge p.78 
106
 Secretary of State for the Home department v JJ and others [2006] EWHC 1623 (admin) 
107
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v E and another [2007] UKHL 47 
108
 Gearty (see note 49) pp.38-41 
109
 Ibid pp.41-44 
110
 Ibid p.40 
111
 (2012) No 186 NYLJ 1202581035138 
112
 Ibid at paragraph 10 
113
 BBC News (2013) Woolwich attack: Drummer Lee Rigby named as victim retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22635206 [accessed 1st March 2014] 
114
 The Baltimore Sun (2013) Seven months after Boston Marathon bombing, local victim walking retrieved 
from http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-bs-md-erika-brannock-profile-
20131110,0,5575246.htmlstory [accessed 1
st
 march 2014] 
115
  BBC News 19
th
 August 2013 ‘Heathrow detention: “They asked me about my whole life”’ retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23760966 [accessed 2nd September 2013] 
116
 O’Carroll, L. and Norton-Taylor, R. (2013) David Miranda detention prompts outcry over ‘gross misuse’ of 
terror laws The Guardian 19
th
 August 2013 retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-detention-outcry-terrorism-laws [accessed 
2nd September 2013] 
117
 Section 13(2) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
118
 Rusbridger, A. (2013) David Miranda, schedule 7 and the danger that all reporters now face The Guardian 
19
th
 August 2013 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-
schedule7-danger-reporters [accessed 2nd September 2013] 
119
 Collins J CC v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] EWHCX 3316 (Admin) at paragraph 11 
120
 This applies to immigration officers and customs officers as well as police officers 
121
 Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000, paragraph 2(2)(b) 
122
 Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 paragraph 2(4) 
123
 Code of Practice for examining officers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 Paragraph 34 
124
 Ibid paragraph 35 
125
 Bean J in Elosta v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and (10 the Law Society (20 the Secretary of 
state for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3397 (Admin) at paragraph 45 
126
 Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 paragraph 5 
127
 Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 paragraph 8 
128
 Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 paragraph 11 
129
 Greenwald (see note 25) 
130
 [2013] EWHC 2573 (Admin) 
131
 Ibid at paragraph 8 
132
 Ibid at paragraph 112 
133
 Ibid paragraph 142 
134
 David Miranda v the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Commissioner of the Police for the 
Metropolis [2014] EWHC 255 
135
 Ibid at paragraph 32 
136
 Ibid at paragraphs 35 and 36 
137
 Ibid paragraph 53 
138
 Ibid at paragraph 58 
139
 Ibid at paragraph 71 
140
 Murphy (see note 18) p.234 
141
 ICJ (see note 1) p.21 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
142
 Yoo, J. (2010) Counterterrorism and the Constitution: Does Providing Security Require a Trade-Off with Civil 
Liberties? In Gottlieb, S. (editor) Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspective on Causes, 
Contexts and Responses Washington: CQ Press 336-352 pp.347-350 
143
 Washington Post (2013) Public reaction to NSA monitoring retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/public-reaction-to-nsa-monitoring/2013/06/10/90dd1e60-d207-
11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_graphic.html [accessed 2nd March 2014] 
144 Evans, J. (2012) ‘The Olympics and Beyond’ MI5 website https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-
are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-the-director-general/the-olympics-and-beyond.html 
[accessed 21st August 2013] at paragraph 11 
145
 Leveson, the Right Honourable Lord Justice (2012) An Inquiry into Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press 
Volume 1 London: The Stationary Office p.65 
146
 Parker, A. (2013) MI5 Security Service Director general’s Speech at RUSI retrieved from 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-
the-director-general/director-generals-speech-at-rusi-2013.html [accessed 1st March 2014] 
147
 Palmer (see note 48) p.527 
148
 Ibid p.535 
149
 Ibid p.536 
